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REMEDYING JuDIcIAL LIMITATIONS ON TRADEMARK
REMEDIES: MONETARY RELIEF SHOULD NOT REQUIRE
PROOF OF ACTUAL CONFUSION
KEITH M. STOLTE*
In recent years, the federal courts have imposed certain stringent,
judicially derived limitations on a trademark owner's right to relief for
infringement and unfair competition.' Requirements relating to a plain-
tiff's need to prove an infringer's bad faith or the existence of actual con-
fusion have become so pervasive in the courts that the Restatement
(Third) of Unfair Competition has adopted these court-made conditions
for recovery.2 These restrictions have absolutely no basis in the Trade-
mark Act of 1946 (Lanham Act) or in the legislative history of the Act:
Nevertheless, recent court decisions now cite as conclusive authority the
position taken by the Restatement with respect to these rules rather than
rely on an independent review of the Lanham Act itself or its legislative
history.' Unfortunately, over the past twenty years, these two rules have
become unquestioned, black letter principles.
* Intellectual Property Administrator, Win. Wrigley Jr. Company, Chicago, Ill. B.A., 1987,
University of Chicago; J.D., 1998, The John Marshall Law School, Chicago (magna cum laude). The
author wishes to extend appreciation to Jerome Gilson for his helpful comments on this article.
1. Specifically, some federal circuit courts have imposed a duty on trademark owners to
prove that an infringer acted with bad faith, willfulness or with fraudulent intent in order to obtain an
accounting of the defendant's profits. See International Star Class Yacht Racing Ass'n v. Tommy
Hilfiger, U.S.A., Inc., 80 F.3d 749, 753 (2d Cir. 1996) (requiring proof that the defendant acted in
bad faith before an accounting of profits could be obtained); George Basch Co. v. Blue Coral, Inc.,
968 F.2d 1532, 1540 (2d Cir. 1992) (holding that a plaintiff has the burden of showing that a
defendant willfully infringed his trademark before a court can grant an accounting of profits). The
circuit courts have also generally created a requirement that a trademark owner make a showing of
actual confusion in order to obtain a judgment for damages, and sometimes profits as well. See
Tommy Hilfiger, 80 F.3d at 753 (holding that a plaintiff must show actual consumer confusion in
order to recover damages); Web Printing Controls Co. v. Oxy-Dry Corp., 906 F.2d 1202, 1204-05
(7th Cir. 1990) (stating that "[a] plaintiff wishing to recover damages for a violation of the Lanham
Act must prove the defendant's Lanham Act violation, [and] that the violation caused actual
confusion"); Frisch's Restaurants, Inc. v. Elby's Big Boy, Inc., 670 F.2d 642, 647 (6th Cir. 1982)
(holding that it is necessary for a trademark owner to show that the buying public was actually
confused to recover damages in a case involving unfair competition).
2. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITON § 37 cmt. e (1995) (discussing the
requirement of a defendant's bad faith for an accounting of profits); Id. § 36 cmt. i (claiming that a
plaintiff is entitled to money damages for trademark infringement only on a showing of actual
confusion).
3. Trademark (Lanham) Act of 1946, ch. 540, 60 Stat. 427 (1946) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1994 & Supp. 1 1995)). All references to sections of the Lanham Act in the
text refer to the session law.
4. See, e.g., Tommy Hilfiger, 80 F.3d at 753-55 (citing the Restatement as authority for the
requisite showing of bad faith to obtain profits and actual confusion in order to recover damages).
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In a companion article,' the author has comprehensively demon-
strated that a stringent rule requiring bad faith in order to obtain an ac-
counting of profits is contrary to the statutory language of the Lanham
Act and congressional intent as espoused in the legislative history of the
Act.' The purpose of the present article is to demonstrate that the Lanham
Act does not require a trademark owner to provide a showing of actual
consumer confusion before a court may grant monetary compensation for
infringement or unfair competition. This article will also establish that
Congress never even contemplated such a strict condition on recovery of
damages or profits and that such a requirement offends the flexibility that
the drafters of the Lanham Act clearly intended courts to employ in
awarding monetary remedies in trademark cases.
Part I of this article will briefly set forth the remedies available un-
der the Lanham Act for trademark infringement and unfair competition
and will explore the legislative history to understand Congress's intent
with respect to trademark remedies.7 Part II will illustrate the courts' de-
velopment of a stringent requirement to prove actual confusion. Part III
will demonstrate that the "actual confusion" rule offends the principles
underlying the Lanham Act. Finally, Part 11 will also argue that the rule
is inherently harsh, unfair and inequitable to trademark owners and that
the courts themselves overwhelmingly recognize this inequity, but nev-
ertheless continue to apply the rule.
I. TRADEMARK AND UNFAIR COMPETITION REMEDIES UNDER THE
LANHAM ACT
The Lanham Act specifically sets forth the types of relief that a
plaintiff may seek in a case involving trademark infringement or unfair
competition as defined in sections 34 and 35.8 The Act provides for both
injunctive relief and monetary compensation. These two forms of relief
are treated separately in two distinct sections. The remedy of injunctive
relief is provided for in section 34.9 Injunctive relief can be enormously
5. Keith M. Stolte, Remedying Judicial Limitations on Trademark Remedies: An Accounting
of Profits Should Not Require a Finding of Bad Faith, 87 TRADEMARK REP. 271 (1997).
6. See id. at 293-99 (demonstrating that a bad faith requirement to obtain an accounting of
profits conflicts with the language of the Lanham Act and congressional intent).
7. For a complete review of the legislative history bearing on the trademark remedies
provided for in the Lanham Act, see 8 & 9 JEROME GILSON, TRADEMARK PROTECTON AND
PRAcTIcE, 34-1 to 34-634 & 35-1 to 35-20 (1997).
8. Lanham Act §§ 34-35, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1116-1117. Conduct which is generally referred to as
unfair competition is govemed by section 43(a) of the Act. See id. § 43(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a).
9. Section 34 states:
The several courts vested with jurisdiction of civil actions arising under this chapter
shall have the power to grant injunctions, according to the principles of equity and upon
such terms as the court may deem reasonable, to prevent the violation of any right of the
registrant of a mark registered in the Patent and Trademark Office or to prevent a
violation under section 1125(a) of this title [(Lanham Act § 43(a))].
Id. §34, 15 U.S.C. § 1116.
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valuable to a plaintiff who seeks a complete or partial cessation of corro-
sive and damaging trademark infringement.'" An injunction is necessary
to restrain an infringer from any current or prospective infringing activi-
ties. In some cases, injunctive relief may entirely satisfy a plaintiff, par-
ticularly in the case where an infringer has not yet entered the market in
any appreciable manner, or where past sales of infringing articles have
not caused significant damage to a trademark owner. Where an in-
fringer's activities, however, have caused injury to a trademark owner,
the Lanham Act clearly entitles the trademark owner to compensation for
such damage.
In addition to the injunctive relief available under section 34, Con-
gress provided trademark owners who have sustained damages as a result
of trademark infringement to recoup their damages from an infringer
through various forms of monetary relief." In order to compensate an
injured trademark owner to the full extent of his injuries, Congress ex-
plicitly entitled a trademark owner to an infringer's profits,'2 and/or to
10. See 3 GILSON, supra note 7, § 8.07, 8-126 to 8-130. Under the provision for injunctive
relief, courts possess very broad discretionary powers to mold an injunction to meet the exigencies
of a particular case. Id. § 8.07, 8-128 to 8-129. In fact, the types of conduct which a court can
regulate under section 34 are "virtually limitless." Id. For example, a court may restrain current
practices of infringement and even threatened or imminent activities. Id. § 8.07, 8-130. Depending
on the urgency and merits of an infringement case, a court may grant temporary relief in the form of
a temporary restraining order, interim relief in the form of a preliminary injunction and permanent
relief in the form of a permanent injunction. Id. § 8.07, 8-127. Moreover, a court may grant complete
relief and order an infringer to refrain from all uses of a mark or trade dress or a court may award
modified relief and merely order an infringer to change some aspect of his use of a mark. Id.
11. Section 35(a) states:
When a violation of any right of the registrant of a mark registered in the Patent and
Trademark Office, or a violation under section 1125(a)of this title [(Lanham Act §
43(a))], shall have been established in any civil action arising under this chapter, the
plaintiff shall be entitled, subject to the provisions of sections 1111 and 1114 of this title
[(Lanham Act §§ 29, 32)], and subject to the principles of equity, to recover (1)
defendant's profits, (2) any damages sustained by the plaintiff, and (3) the costs of the
action. The court shall assess such profits and damages or cause the same to be assessed
under its direction. In assessing profits the plaintiff shall be required to prove defendant's
sales only; defendant must prove all elements of cost or deduction claimed. In assessing
damages the court may enter judgment, according to the circumstances of the case, for
any sum above the amount found as actual damages, not exceeding three times such
amount. If the court shall find that the amount of the recovery based on profits is either
inadequate or excessive the court may in its discretion enter judgment for such sum as the
court shall find to be just, according to the circumstances of the case. Such sum in either
of the above circumstances shall constitute compensation and not a penalty. The court in
exceptional circumstances may award reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party.
Lanham Act § 35(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a).
12. Section 35(a) clearly authorizes a court to award a defendant's profits as one means of
compensating a plaintiff for any violation of the plaintiff's trademark rights, as set forth in section
32. Id. § 32, 15 U.S.C. § 1114. Moreover, the language of section 35(a) explicitly indicates that a
court may, within its discretion, adjust the level of profits owing to a plaintiff, depending on whether
the court believes that the profits proven are inadequate or excessive. Id. § 35(a), 15 U.S.C. §
1117(a).
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whatever damages the plaintiff can fairly establish.'" If profits are to be
awarded, section 35 indicates that the defendant bears the burden of
proving his costs and other allowable deductions." The plaintiff need
only prove the defendant's sales."' The scope of damages to which a
plaintiff may be entitled includes the loss of goodwill associated with his
trademark, the plaintiffs lost sales, the plaintiff's lost profits, and cor-
rective advertising expenses.
The awarding of profits and damages are not mutually exclusive.
Unlike English trademark law, which forces a plaintiff to elect either the
defendant's profits or the plaintiff's damages,'7 the Lanham Act entitles
an injured trademark owner to any fair combination of the two forms of
relief that would adequately compensate him.'" Therefore, in theory, a
plaintiff may receive an accounting of profits or an award of damages or
some fair combination of both.'9 However, where a court concludes that
the plaintiff cannot establish actual damages, and the equities of the case
would be fully satisfied by an injunction, a court will not award either
type of monetary relief.'
Congress made clear that the remedies enumerated in section 35,
possibly excepting the discretionary grant of attorney fees, represent only
compensation for the plaintiff's injury and should not constitute punitive
damages.2' In addition, Congress also subjected a grant of the defendant's
profits or the plaintiff's damages to the "principles of equity." ' This re-
.quirement complements Congress's express intention that the courts
award monetary compensation fairly and justly and "according to the
13. Again, section 35(a) grants a court the discretion to enhance the amount of damages, in
addition to the determined value of actual damages, to a level not to exceed three times the amount
of actual damages. Id. § 35(a), 15 U.S.C. § I117(a).
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. 3 GILSON, supra note 7, § 8.08[2], 8-176.
17. See Hamilton-Brown Shoe Co. v. Wolf Bros. & Co., 240 U.S. 251, 259 (1916)
(distinguishing the U.S. method of awarding both damages and profits from the law of England
which requires the aggrieved party to choose one or the other); see also Aladdin Mfg. Co. v. Mantle
Lamp Co., 116 F.2d 708, 715 (7th Cir. 1941) (providing a brief history of the development of the
equitable remedy of profits in infringement suits).
18. Lanham Act § 35(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a); see also Aladdin, 116 F.2d at 715.
19. Hamilton-Brown, 240 U.S. at 259.
20. Champion Spark Plug Co. v. Sanders, 331 U.S. 125, 131-32 (1947) (holding that where a
plaintiff failed to show any significant damages and where the court found little likelihood of profit
to the defendant, an injunction satisfied the equities of the case).
21. Lanham Act § 35(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a). For a thorough discussion of the federal courts'
view that the Lanham Act did not envision punitive damages, see generally Getty Petroleum Corp. v.
Bartco Petroleum Corp., 858 F.2d 103 (2d Cir. 1988).
22. Lanham Act § 35(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a). It is not clear what the drafters of the Lanham
Act meant by "principles of equity" in section 35(a). In another section of the Lanham Act, Congress
explicitly identified, partially at least, what it deemed "principles of equity." In 1988, Congress
amended section 33 to indicate that the subject matter of the section was subject to "equitable
principles, including laches, estoppel, and acquiescence. 15 U.S.C. § 1115.
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circumstances of the case."'23 A review of the language of sections 34 and
35 of the Lanham Act clearly suggests that Congress balanced its desire
to provide trademark owners with the widest latitude of relief against
infringement. It believed that, in trade related civil actions, the courts
should be given a broad level of discretion to formulate a fair and equita-
ble remedy on a case by case basis." As the next Part will demonstrate,
some courts, rather than analyze the fairness and equities of particular
remedies based on the individualized facts of each case, have instead
created "black letter" principles which effectively destroy the flexibility
and fairness that Congress explicitly intended the courts to employ.'
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE "ACTUAL CONFUSION" RULE
For reasons entirely unconnected with the statutory language of the
Lanham Act or with the legislative history, many circuit courts have
adopted a strict rule that requires trademark owners to prove actual con-
sumer confusion before they are entitled to monetary compensation for
trademark infringement or unfair competition.26 Some circuits only pre-
23. Lanham Act § 35(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a). The statutory authorization of a broad
discretion given to the courts to adjust the monetary compensation is specific to both profits and
damages. See id.
24. In evaluating the issue of monetary compensation in the form of damages or profits, the
framers of the Lanham Act expressed grave concern for ensuring that the law provide a flexible and
fair manner by which the courts were to craft appropriate remedies for trademark infringement.
Trade-Marks: Hearings on H.R. 102, H.R. 5461 and S. 895 Before the Subcomm. on Trade-Marks of
the House Comm. on Patents, 77th Cong. 203-06 (1941) [hereinafter Hearings]. One member of the
House Subcommittee on Trademarks expressed his horror that the counter-plaintiff in L.P. Larson,
Jr., Co. v. Win. Wrigley Jr. Co., 20 F.2d 830 (7th Cir. 1927), was awarded more than five million
dollars in profits upon very little showing of any damage. Hearings, supra at 204. Edward S. Rogers,
a main proponent and draftsman of the legislation that ultimately became the Lanham Act,
responded by stating that he too believed the Larson profit award to be excessive, but that the Larson
court had no authority to reduce the award under the Trademark Act of 1905, ch. 592, 33 Stat. 730
(1905). Ironically, Mr. Rogers had represented Mr. Larson, the recipient of the massive windfall, in
at least one of the numerous related cases that resulted in the award. See L.P. Larson, Jr., Co. v. Wm.
Wrigley Jr. Co., 253 F. 914, 915 (7th Cir. 1918). Rogers clarified that the bill under consideration
was intended to place:
discretion in the hands of the court under the circumstances of the particular case either to
increase or decrease the recovery; if in one case [the recovery) is excessive, it ought to be
decreased, and if, on the other hand, it is not enough, a reasonable sum in the way of
ordinary damages ought to be awarded.
Hearings, supra at 205. Concluding his comments, Rogers stated that "[tihe whole purpose of this
section Dater codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1117], Mr. Chairman, was to give a thing that is now inflexible,
a certain flexibility and rely on good judgment of the court to see that the recovery was not excessive
but was at least adequate." Id. at 206. Congressman Fritz Lanham, for whom the Lanham Act is
named, agreed, stating that "we have to rely upon the courts in their discretion to administer these
things fairly. I do not know what other assumption that we can make." Id. at 205-06.
25. See Burger King Corp. v. Mason, 710 F.2d 1480, 1495 n.11 (l1th Cir. 1988) (stating that,
because all monetary remedies set forth in section 35(a) are subject to the principles of equity, "no
hard and fast rules dictate the form or quantum of relief").
26. See International Star Class Yacht Racing Ass'n v. Tommy Hilfiger, U.S.A., Inc., 80 F.3d
749, 753 (2d Cir. 1996) (requiring proof of actual consumer confusion before an award of damages
could be obtained); Libman Co. v. Vining Indus., 69 F.3d 1360, 1363 (7th Cir. 1995) (stating that
actual confusion is necessary where damages are sought); Conopco, Inc. v. May Dep't Stores Co., 46
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clude the awarding of damages absent actual confusion while allowing
an accounting of profits." Other courts deny all forms of monetary com-
pensation. 8
Only one circuit, the Ninth, has explicitly refused to adopt a strin-
gent rule with respect to a necessary showing of actual confusion for the
grant of either profits or damages, preferring instead to base recovery on
the totality of the circumstances of each particular case. ' Of course, the
position adopted by the Ninth Circuit closely comports with the actual
language of the Lanham Act30 and the underlying congressional intent as
found in the legislative history of the Act.'
F.3d 1556, 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (holding that "[tJo establish entitlement to monetary relief [for
unfair competition under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act], a plaintiff must show actual confusion");
W.W.W. Pharmaceutical Co. v. Gillette Co., 984 F.2d 567, 576 n.6 (2d Cir. 1993) (stating that in the
Second Circuit, "proof of real and precise actual consumer confusion is required to recover
damages"); Coach Leatherware Co. v. Ann Taylor, Inc., 933 F.2d 162, 171 (2d Cir. 1991) (requiring
actual confusion before a trademark plaintiff may recover damages); Web Printing Controls Co. v.
Oxy-Dry Corp., 906 F.2d 1202, 1204-05 (7th Cir. 1990) (indicating that to collect damages for a
violation of the Lanham Act, a plaintiff must establish actual confusion); Woodsmith Publishing Co.
v. Meredith Corp., 904 F.2d 1244, 1247 n.5 (8th Cir. 1990) (holding that "[p]roof of actual
confusion is necessary for an award of damages"); Frisch's Restaurants, Inc. v. Elby's Big Boy, Inc.,
670 F.2d 642, 647 (6th Cir. 1982) (stating that "it is necessary to prove that the buying public was
actually deceived in order to recover damages"); Parkway Baking Co. v. Freihofer Baking Co., 255
F.2d 641,648 (3d Cir. 1958) (stating that, for an action of unfair competition and false advertising, a
plaintiff must demonstrate that a portion of the public had actually been deceived).
27. See, e.g., Tommy Hilfiger, 80 F.3d at 753-54 (denying damages but reserving the
possibility of an award of an infringer's profits where a plaintiff did not prove actual confusion);
Web Printing Controls, 906 F.2d at 1204-05 (foreclosing a grant of damages in the absence of actual
consumer confusion, but preserving the right to profits); Monsanto Chem. Co. v. Perfect Fit Prods.
Mfg. Co., 349 F.2d 389, 391-92, 395 (2d Cir. 1965) (denying damages but awarding an accounting
of profits where there was no proof of actual confusion); Century Distilling Co. v. Continental
Distilling Corp., 205 F.2d 140, 144 (3d Cir. 1953); Resorts Int'l, Inc. v. Great Bay Hotel & Casino,
Inc., 830 F. Supp. 826, 838-39 (D.N.J. 1992).
28. See, e.g., Conopco, 46 F.3d at 1563 (holding that "[t]o establish [any] monetary relief, a
plaintiff must show actual confusion").
29. Lindy Pen Co. v. Bic Pen Corp., 982 F.2d 1400, 1410-11 (9th Cir. 1993). Following the
actual statutory dictates of section 35(a) of the Lanham Act, the Lindy court stated:
Other jurisdictions have made a distinction between the elements necessary to
establish a legal basis for liability [i.e. mere likelihood of confusion] from those required
for proof of damages [i.e. actual confusion]. Although we recognize this distinction,
.nevertheless, an inability to show actual damages [through proof of actual confusion]
does not alone preclude a recovery under § 1117.' In so holding, we express a distinct
preference for those opinions permitting relief based on the totality of the circumstances.
Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
30. Lanham Act § 35(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) (1994). This section repeatedly requires courts
to grant relief based on the "circumstances of the case." Id.
31. For a discussion of Congress' clear intent that courts refrain from adopting stringent,
inflexible roles in granting remedies for trademark infringement or unfair competition, and instead to
subject all relief to equitable principles and flexibility, according to the circumstances of case at
issue, see supra notes 21-25 and accompanying text.
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-Outside of citing prior case law and the Restatement, courts do not
always explain the foundational basis for the actual confusion rule." Al-
most without exception, the courts do not cite the Lanham Act or the
legislative history as a basis for the rule.3 Moreover, the Supreme Court
has never addressed this issue."'
In the following pages, Section A will generally discuss what con-
stitutes actual confusion. Section B will explore how the courts variously
employ this concept in determining a likelihood of confusion in order to
establish liability for technical trademark infringement and unfair com-
petition. Section C will focus on why the courts have adopted the actual
confusion rule.
A. What is "Actual Confusion" ?
On its face, the meaning of "actual confusion" seems obvious. 5
Certainly falling within this concept is evidence that actual consumers
have purchased goods bearing an infringing trademark or trade dress
with the mistaken belief that the goods were made or marketed by one
company when in fact the goods were produced by another.36 Consumer
testimony or affidavits relating to purchases made as a result of confu-
sion or mistake in a genuine market context are probably the strongest
32. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETrrON § 36 cmt. i (1995). Comment i states in
relevant part the following with respect to actual confusion: "An actor can be subject to liability for
trademark infringement or deceptive marketing upon proof of a likelihood of confusion or deception,
but the recovery of damages ordinarily requires proof that some consumers have actually been
confused or deceived." Id.
33. Neither the Lanham Act nor the legislative history discusses the need or desirability for
proof of actual confusion to recover any type of monetary relief. The Lanham Act itself is entirely
silent on the concept of actual confusion, limiting the test for infringement to designations which are
"likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive." Lanham Act §§ 32(l)(a), 43(a)(1), 15
U.S.C. §§ 11 14(l)(a), 1125(a)(1). Moreover, Congress apparently never contemplated the concept of
actual confusion during its review of the various pieces of legislation that ultimately culminated in
the Lanham Act. For an exhaustive reprint of the legislative history of the Lanham Act, see GILSON,
supra note 7. Certainly Congress never tied the concept of actual confusion to the entitlement of any
remedies provided by the Act.
34. while the Supreme Court has never had occasion to rule on whether the Lanham Act
subjects the remedies of damages or profits to a showing of actual consumer confusion, the Court
has denied certiorari in numerous cases that did address this issue. See International Star Class Yacht
Racing Ass'n v. Tommy Hilfiger, U.S.A., Inc., 80 F.3d 749, 753-54 (2d Cir. 1996); Libman, Co. v.
Vining Indus., 69 F.3d 1360, 1363 (7th Cir. 1995); Conopco, Inc. v. May Dep't Stores Co., 46 F.3d
1556, 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
35. For a very competent and thorough discussion of the various forms of actual confusion
that courts recognize, see Michael J. Allen, The Role of Actual Confusion Evidence in Federal
Trademark Infringement Litigation, 16 CAMPBELL L. REv. 19, 27-56 (1994).
36. Id. at 28. One prominent trademark scholar and practitioner defines actual confusion as
"instances in which one or more members of the purchasing public have been confused by the
defendant's mark into believing that the defendant's product is made or sponsored by the plaintiff."
2 GILSON, supra note 7, § 5.01[3]; see also Allen, supra note 35, at 28 n.37 (stating that instances of
actual confusion also tend to demonstrate likelihood of reverse confusion).
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evidence of actual confusion.37 This type of evidence, however, is very
difficult to obtain. 8 As a result of this difficulty, the courts will recognize
certain types of circumstantial evidence from which actual confusion can
be inferred.39 Among the forms of circumstantial evidence that courts
acknowledge as relevant to establishing actual confusion are consumer
surveys, inquiries as to sponsorship or relationship, and misdirected
communications.' Many plaintiffs who cannot gather evidence of actual
instances of consumer confusion in a market context have chosen to con-
duct consumer surveys to determine the existence of actual confusion."
While some experts believe that courts should not consider survey evi-
dence as probative on the issue of actual confusion, 2 case law strongly
indicates that the courts heavily rely on this type of evidence to deter-
mine the existence or absence of actual confusion.'3
37. See Allen, supra note 35, at 30 (indicating that courts easily acknowledge a high level of
probative value of evidence establishing consumer purchases resulting from confusion or mistake in
the marketplace); Brunswick Corp. v. Spinit Reel Co., 832 F.2d 513, 521-22 (10th Cir. 1987).
38. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 36 cmt. i (1995); 2 GILSON, supra
note 7, § 5.01[3][a]; see also Money Station, Inc. v. Cash Station, Inc., No. 95-1240, 1995 WL
697313, at **4 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 27, 1995) (stating that actual evidence is "difficult to obtain"); Wynn
Oil Corp. v. American Way Serv. Corp., 943 F.2d 595, 602 (6th Cit. 1991) (recognizing that
"evidence of actual confusion is difficult to produce"); Eclipse Assoc. Ltd. v. Data Gen. Corp., 894
F.2d 1114, 1118 (9th Cir. 1990) (upholding a lower court's decision to discount the absence of
actual confusion because this type of evidence is difficult to gather); Harold F. Ritchie, Inc. v.
Chesebrough-Pond's, Inc., 281 F.2d 755, 761 (2d Cir. 1960) (stating that "reliable evidence of actual
instances of confusion is practically almost impossible to secure"). For a discussion of the
difficulties in securing actual confusion evidence, see infra notes 84-96 and accompanying text.
39. See Allen, supra note 35, at 32-50 (discussing various types of actual confusion evidence
that courts may rely upon instead of mistaken purchase evidence).
40. See Conopco, Inc. v. May Dep't Stores Co., 46 F.3d 1556, 1564 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (stating
that "[a]ctual confusion is normally proven through the use of direct evidence, i.e., testimony from
members of the buying public, as well as through circumstantial evidence, e.g., consumer surveys');
PDX Enters. v. Audiofidelity Enters., 818 F.2d 266, 271 (2d Cir. 1987); see also 2 GILSON, supra
note 7, § 5.01[3]; Allen, supra note 35, at 32-44. Some courts also infer the presence of actual
confusion based on an infringer's bad faith adoption of an identical or confusingly similar trademark
or trade dress. Resource Developers, Inc. v. Statue of Liberty-Ellis Island Found., Inc., 926 F.2d 134,
140 (2d Cir. 1991); New York Racing Ass'n, Inc. v. Stroup News Agency Corp., 920 F. Supp. 295,
300 (N.D.N.Y. 1996). Some courts may infer actual confusion where the defendant has intentionally
infringed a protected trademark or trafficked in counterfeit goods. Statue of Liberty, 926 F.2d at 140;
Getty Petroleum Corp. v. Island Transp. Corp., 878 F.2d 650, 656 (2d Cir. 1989); Stroup News, 920
F. Supp. at 300.
41. See Edwin S. Clark, Finding Likelihood of Confusion with Actual Confusion: A Critical
Analysis of the Federal Courts' Approach, 22 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 393, 408-09 (1992)
(discussing the wide usage of survey evidence as a surrogate for actual mistaken purchase evidence
in trademark infringement cases). Confusion surveys are now so prevalent in infringement litigation
that a plaintiff's failure to conduct one can lead to an inference that confusion does not exist. Id. at
408. For a general discussion of the use of survey evidence in trademark cases, see 4 J. THOMAS
MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION §§ 32.46-32.55 (3d ed. 1992).
42. See Allen, supra note 35, at 55 (stating that survey evidence does not adequately
correspond to actual confusion of consumers in the real marketplace).
43. See Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co. v. Novak, 836 F.2d 397, 400 (8th Cir. 1987); Ambrit, Inc.
v. Kraft, Inc., 812 F.2d 1531, 1544 (11th Cir. 1986); see Lawrence E. Evans, Jr. & David H. Gunn,
Trademark Survey Evidence, 20 TEx. TECH. L. REv. 1 (1989). It is important, however, to ensure
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Other forms of evidence that many courts will recognize as proba-
tive of the existence of actual confusion are inquiries as to affiliation,
sponsorship, or relationship." Some courts, however, refuse to acknowl-
edge the relevance of these types of inquiries." An example of this type
of actual confusion evidence would be written or telephonic inquiries
received by the Wi. Wrigley Jr. Company for information regarding a
sporting event entitled "The DOUBLEMINT Marathon," where the
Wrigley Company has no relationship with or sponsorship of the event.
Similarly, courts will also sometimes infer actual confusion based
on evidence of misdirected communications. ' An example of misdi-
rected communication would be where the Win. Wrigley Jr. Company
received purchase orders for candy products actually produced by the
Wiggely Company. Due to the overly speculative nature of the motiva-
tion behind misdirected communications, many courts find that this type
of evidence is least probative to the existence of actual confusion."
B. The Courts' Reliance on Actual Confusion in Determining Likeli-
hood of Confusion
While actual confusion is not strictly necessary for a finding of
likelihood of confusion, the courts are universally agreed that a signifi-
cant presence of actual confusion is highly relevant to the question of
whether a likelihood of confusion exists.' Similarly, many courts find
that the survey protocol is developed properly and the survey is conducted in an appropriate manner.
See Amstar Corp. v. Domino's Pizza, Inc., 615 F.2d 252, 263 (5th Cir. 1980) (rejecting the surveys
of both plaintiff and defendant due to faulty protocol and inappropriate conduct of the surveys); see
also Daniel A. Klein, Annotation, Admissibility and Weight of Consumer Survey in Litigation under
Trademark Opposition, Trademark Infringement, and False Designation of Origin Provisions of
Lanham Act (15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1063, 1114 and 1125), 90 A.L.R. FED. 20, 23 (1990) (stating that
surveys should be developed and conducted in a manner that avoids any taint of bias).
44. Allen, supra note 35, at 39-44; see also Country Floors, Inc. v. Gepner, 930 F.2d 1056 (3d
Cir. 1990); Fuddruckers, Inc. v. Doc's B.R. Others, Inc., 826 F.2d 837, 845 (9th Cir. 1987); Armco,
Inc. v. Armco Burglar Alarm Co., 693 F.2d 1155, 1160 (5th Cir. 1982); Multi-Local Media Corp. v.
800 Yellow Book Inc., 813 F. Supp. 199, 204-05 (E.D.N.Y. 1993).
45. See, e.g., Miss World (UK) Ltd. v. Mrs. Am. Pageants, Inc., 856 F.2d 1445, 1451 (9th Cir.
1988) (rejecting evidence of inquiries seeking information on affiliation or relationship); Jordache
Enter. v. Hogg Wyld, Ltd., 828 F.2d 1482 (10th Cir. 1987); Fisher Stoves, Inc. v. All Nighter Stove
Works, Inc. 626 F.2d 193, 195 (1st Cir. 1980).
46. Allen, supra note 35, at 32-38. See, e.g., Cullman Ventures, Inc. v. Columbian Art Works,
Inc., 717 F. Supp. 96, 130 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (holding that "misdirected [purchase] order[s] evidences
some actual confusion that is worthy of consideration"); Moore Bus. Forms, Inc. v. Seidenburg, 619
F. Supp. 1173, 1184 (W.D. La. 1985) (stating that actual confusion can be inferred from misdirected
telephone purchase orders and from Post Office and UPS delivery confusion).
47. Allen, supra note 35, at 34-36.
48. World Carpets, Inc. v. Dick Littrell's New World Carpets, 438 F.2d 482, 489 (5th Cir.
1971). The Fifth Circuit summed up the almost dispositive nature of actual confusion evidence in the
following manner
There can be no more positive or substantial proof of the likelihood of confusion than
proof of actual confusion. Moreover, reason tells us that while very little proof of actual
confusion would be necessary to prove the likelihood of confusion, an almost
overwhelming amount of proof would be necessary to refute such proof.
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that where the two parties have concurrently used their respective trade-
marks or trade dress for a significant period of time and the plaintiff
proffers little or no proof of actual confusion, the establishment of likeli-
hood of confusion may be doubtful. '9 The existence or absence of actual
confusion, however, is never dispositive in a likelihood of confusion
analysis.
Of course, the Lanham Act's statutory benchmark for determining
trademark infringement or unfair competition as defined in section 43(a)
is whether there exists a likelihood of confusion between a plaintiff's
mark or trade dress and a defendant's mark or trade dress.' Proof of ac-
tual confusion is merely one of a number of factors that courts analyze in
order to arrive at a determination of whether or not likelihood of confu-
sion exists.' While there are slight differences between the tests that the
circuits apply in resolving the issue of likelihood of confusion 2 most
circuits more or less adhere to all or at least many of the factors used in
the test set forth by the Second Circuit in its landmark decision in Polar-
oid Corp. v. Polarad Electronics Corp.3
The factors enumerated by the Polaroid court are: (1) strength of the
plaintiff's trademark; (2) similarity between the trademarks; (3) the
similarity or relationship between the respective goods; (4) the defen-
dant's intent; (5) the level of consumer sophistication; (6) the quality of
the defendant's product; (7) the likelihood that the plaintiff will fill the
gap (where the parties are not in direct competition); and (8) the presence
Id. The Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition specifically recognizes the highly probative value
of actual confusion evidence in determining whether or not a likelihood of confusion in trademark
infringement cases exists:
(1) A likelihood of confusion may be inferred from proof of actual confusion.
(2) An absence of likelihood of confusion may be inferred from the absence of proof of
actual confusion if the actor and the [trademark owner] have made significant use of their
respective designations in the same geographic market for a substantial period of time,
and any resulting confusion would ordinarily be manifested by probable facts.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITON § 23 (1995). The Restatement further claims that
all courts recognize the importance of actual confusion evidence in the rubric of likelihood of
confusion analysis, emphasizing that "convincing evidence of actual confusion is ordinarily
decisive." Id. § 23 cmt. b.
49. RESTATEMENT (THrP) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 23(2) (1995); see also Homeowners
Group, Inc. v. Home Marketing Specialists, Inc., 931 F.2d 1100 (6th Cir. 1991); Plus Prods. v. Plus
Discount Foods, Inc., 722 F.2d 999 (2d Ci. 1983).
50. Lanham Act §§ 32(1)(a), 43(a), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114(1)(a), 1125(a) (1994). A violation of
these sections occurs where a person's use of a trademark or trade dress "is likely to cause
confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive" consumers as to the source of the person's goods or
services. Id.
51. See generally Clark, supra note 41 (providing a critical analysis of a recent trend in the
courts to overemphasize the actual confusion factor in determining likelihood of confusion, to the
detriment of other traditional factors).
52. 2 GILSON, supra note 7, § 5.01[31[i].
53. 287 F.2d 492 (2d Cir. 1961).
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of actual confusion." These factors are nonexclusive, and the courts
weigh the respective factors differently, generally depending on the cir-
cumstances of each particular case.55
Depending on the facts, courts vary in their reliance on proof of
actual confusion in concluding a likelihood of confusion." A few courts
automatically place great weight on the actual confusion factor, particu-
larly where a plaintiff has provided at least some proof of actual confu-
sion. 7 But, because of the inherent and universally acknowledged diffi-
culty of obtaining reliable proof of actual confusion, almost all courts
place antithetical emphasis on this factor, depending on whether or not
such proof exists.5" That is, where a plaintiff is able to produce actual
confusion evidence, courts will give such proof significant weight be-
cause proof of actual confusion is typically difficult to obtain. 9 On the
54. Polaroid, 287 F.2d at 495; see also Smith Fiberglass Prods., Inc. v. Ameron, Inc., 7 F.3d
1327, 1329 (7th Cir. 1993) (discussing additional factors such as the area and manner of concurrent
use and the degree of care expected to be exercised by consumers).
55. See McGraw-Edison Co. v. Walt Disney Prods., 787 F.2d 1163, 1167 (7th Cir. 1986)
(explaining that "[n]one of these factors by itself is dispositive of the likelihood of confusion
question").
56. See Ambrit, Inc. v. Kraft, Inc., 812 F.2d 1531, 1543 (1 1th Cir. 1986) (stating that courts
should evaluate proof of actual confusion "in the light of the totality of the circumstances involved").
For example, in determining the quantum of actual confusion that could tip the scales in terms of
relevancy or persuasiveness, the Eleventh Circuit stated.
Perhaps as important as, and helping to explain the various interpretations of the
relevance of, the number of instances of confusion are the kinds of persons confused and
degree of confusion. Short-lived confusion or confusion of individuals casually
acquainted with a business is worthy of little weight, while confusion of actual customers
of a business is worthy of substantial weight.
Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Safeway Discount Drugs, Inc., 675 F.2d 1160, 1167 (11th Cir. 1982)
(citation omitted).
57. Frisch's Restaurants, Inc. v. Elby's Big Boy, Inc., 670 F.2d 642, 648 n.5 (6th Cir. 1982)
(opining that "it is difficult to conceive of a situation where a showing of substantial actual
confusion would not result in a legal conclusion of likelihood of confusion"); Helene Curtis Indus. v.
Church & Dwight Co., 560 F.2d 1325, 1330 (7th Cir. 1977) (indicating that actual confusion
evidence, when available, "is entitled to substantial weight"); Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Safeway Ins.
Co., 657 F. Supp. 1307, 1316 (M.D. La. 1985), affd, 791 F.2d 929 (5th Cir. 1986) (stating
emphatically that "a sufficient demonstration of actual confusion could sustain a finding of the
likelihood of confusion even in the absence of other proof").
58. See Wynn Oil Co. v. American Way Serv. Corp., 943 F.2d 595, 602 (6th Cir. 1991)
(acknowledging that it is difficult to produce evidence of actual confusion); Lois Sportswear, U.S.A.,
Inc. v. Levi Strauss & Co., 799 F.2d 867, 875 (2d Cir. 1986) (indicating that "actual confusion is
very difficult to prove"); W.E. Bassett Co. v. Revlon, Inc., 435 F.2d 656, 661 (2d Cir. 1970)
(explaining that a showing of actual confusion is very difficult to demonstrate); Harold F. Ritchie,
Inc. v. Chesebrough-Pond's, Inc., 281 F.2d 755, 761 (2d Cir. 1960) (stating that the courts recognize
"that reliable evidence of actual instances of confusion is practically almost impossible to secure").
For a discussion of the difficulties in securing actual confusion evidence, see infra notes 84-96 and
accompanying text.
59. Dozens of federal court decisions make clear that because of the inherent difficulty in
obtaining and producing reliable and admissible proof of actual confusion, when proof is offered, it
is highly significant in assessing the existence of a likelihood of confusion. See, e.g., Wynn Oil Co.
v. Thomas, 839 F.2d 1183, 1188 (6th Cir. 1988); Bandag, Inc. v. A] Bolser's Tire Stores, Inc., 750
F.2d 903, 914 (Fed. Cir. 1984); Golden Door, Inc. v. Odisho, 646 F.2d 347, 351 (9th Cir. 1980);
Grotrian, Helfferich, Schulz, Th. Steinwen Nachf. v. Steinway and Sons, 523 F.2d 1331, 1340 (2d
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other hand, where a plaintiff does not make a showing of actual confu-
sion, courts generally discount the actual confusion factor for the same
reason.6
C. Why the Courts Adopted the Actual Confision Rule
After an exhaustive review of scores of federal court decisions, nu-
merous law review articles, trademark treatises, hundreds of pages of the
legislative history of the Lanham Act and other materials, the author has
found no authority that conclusively explains why courts have imposed a
requirement that a plaintiff prove actual confusion before being entitled
to damages and/or an accounting of profits.6 The Restatement (Third) of
Unfair Competition implies that the courts view actual confusion evi-
dence as a surrogate for proof of the fact of actual damage, a requisite
element for recovery.62 One respected authority on trademark remedies
takes a similar approach in explaining why courts have adopted the strin-
Cir. 1975); Tisch Hotels, Inc. v. Americana Inn, Inc., 350 F.2d 609, 612 (7th Cir. 1965); American
Auto. Ass'n, Inc. v. AAA Ins. Agency, Inc., 618 F. Supp. 787,794 (W.D. Tex. 1985).
60. Wynn Oil, 943 F.2d at 602; Eclipse Assocs. Ltd. v. Data Gen. Corp., 894 F.2d 1114, 1118
(9th Cir. 1990); Roulo v. Russ Berrie & Co., 886 F.2d 931, 937 (7th Cir. 1989); Lois Sportswear,
799 F.2d at 875; Chevron Chem. Co. v. Voluntary Purchasing Groups, Inc., 659 F.2d 695, 704 (5th
Ci. 1981). In addition to the use of actual confusion to demonstrate likelihood of confusion, courts
may also use actual confusion evidence to determine whether a mark has acquired secondary
meaning. See AJ. Canfield Co. v. Vess Beverages, Inc., 796 F.2d 903, 907 (7th Cir. 1986) (stating
that letters and phone calls that evidenced instances of actual confusion could be sufficient to
demonstrate secondary meaning); American Scientific Chem., Inc. v. American Hosp. Supply Corp.,
690 F.2d 791, 793 (9th Ci. 1982) (relying on examples of actual confusion as an "indicium" of a
mark's secondary meaning).
61. The scholarly literature and the case decisions merely recite the rule without explaining
why it exists. At least one prominent trademark scholar and practitioner has pointed out that the rule
is not apparent from the Lanham Act itself and suggests the actual confusion requirement developed
out of a similar rule as traditionally applied to false advertisement cases under section 43(a) of the
Lanham Act. 3 GILSON, supra note 7, § 8.08[2] n.7.
62. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETrriON § 36 cmt. i (1995). Without specifically
drawing a connection between a plaintiff's duty to prove actual damage and the alternative showing
of actual confusion, the drafters of the Restatement seem to imply such a connection in addressing a
plaintiff's burden of proving certainty of the fact of loss:
Although the plaintiff bears the burden of proving both the fact and extent of its
pecuniary loss, the difficulty of quantifying loss in a market context frequently justifies a
less exacting standard of proof for the amount than for the fact of loss. Once the fact of
loss caused by the defendant's misconduct has been established, the plaintiff's burden
may be satisfied by evidence that furnishes a reasonable basis for computing damages.
The plaintiff is not obliged to provide individualized proof of lost sales. As the fact and
extent of the loss become more uncertain, however, the risk increases that an award of
damages will represent a windfall to the plaintiff and a penalty to the defendant. In such
cases, the appropriateness of a damage award depends on whether the other
circumstances of the case justify imposing that risk on the defendant.
An actor can be subject to liability for trademark infringement or deceptive
marketing upon proof of a likelihood of confusion or deception, but the recovery of
damages ordinarily requires proof that some consumers have actually been confused or
deceived.
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gent actual confusion requirement." If this is indeed the justification for
the rule, then it would appear that the courts have lost sight of the fact
that actual injury can be established through other types of evidence.'
A number of older cases applying the actual confusion rule cite as
authority Judge Learned Hand's opinion in G.H. Mumm Champagne v.
Eastern Wine Corp.5 Judge Hand announced that:
It is of course true that to recover damages or profits, whether for in-
fringement of a trade-mark or for unfair competition, it is necessary
to show that buyers, who wished to buy the plaintiff's goods, have
been actually misled into buying the defendant's; but when the ques-
tion is of an injunction, we can find as little warrant for demanding
evidence of actual confusion in cases of unfair competition as in those
of trade-mark. This distinction between the [plaintiff's burden of
proof of damage] was certainly the basis of the [Supreme Court's]
decision in Straus v. Notaseme Hosiery Co.66
Judge Hand's reliance on the Supreme Court's decision in Straus is,
however, misplaced.
The Straus Court did, in fact, uphold the grant of an injunction
based on its recognition of the existence of a likelihood of confusion and
denied an award of profits.6 But the Court denied the award of monetary
compensation in the form of profits, not merely on the basis of an ab-
sence of actual confusion, but mainly because of the Court's combined
beliefs that (1) the plaintiff failed to prove that the defendant acted with
63. James M. Koelemay, Jr., A Practical Guide to Monetary Relief in Trademark Infringement
Cases, 85 TRADEMARK REP. 263, 278-79 (1995). Specifically, Mr. Koelemay explains:
As a substitute for proof of actual injury or unjust enrichment, some courts look to
proof of actual confusion. Proof of confusion demonstrates the existence of legal injury to
the plaintiff, and without confusion a defendant will not have benefitted from the
infringement....
A significant number of recent decisions have gone further and held that actual
confusion must be shown to secure an award of damages, but not for an accounting of the
defendant's profits. Other recent decisions have made proof of actual confusion a
prerequisite to both damages and an accounting.
Id. at 279. Unfortunately, none of the cases that Mr. Koelemay cites explicitly confirm that the
courts' adoption of the actual confusion rule resulted from a willingness to view actual confusion
evidence as a substitute or surrogate for proof of actual injury, although Mr. Koelemay's
characterization may very well be correct. See also Bandag, Inc. v. Al Bolster's Tire Stores, Inc.,
750 F.2d 903, 921 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (drawing a connection between evidence of actual confusion and
the requisite proof of actual injury); Lenscrafters, Inc. v. Vision World, Inc., 943 F. Supp. 1481,
1489 (D. Minn. 1996).
64. This evidence might take the form of, for example, lost sales trends, damage to reputation,
and corrective advertising. A compelling argument can also be made that use of the likelihood of
confusion test should satisfy the requisite showing of actual injury in some cases. For a discussion
on the relative value of the likelihood of confusion test in determining injury, see infra notes 78-83
and accompanying text.
65. 142 F.2d 499 (2d Cir. 1944).
66. Mumm Champagne, 142 F.2d at 501 (citing Straus v. Notaseme Hoisery Co., 240 U.S. 179
(1916)).
67. Straus, 240 U.S. at 183.
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an intent to deceive consumers or "steal the plaintiff's goodwill," (2) the
plaintiff failed to show that the defendant's profits were due entirely to
his unfair competition and (3) that the plaintiff did not provide "evidence
that any deceit or substitution was accomplished in fact.' '8 The Straus
Court did not, as Judge Hand declared in G.H. Mumm, announce a strin-
gent rule requiring proof of actual confusion in order to recover damages
or an accounting of profits, but rather looked at the totality of the circum-
stances and equities in the case.
II. THE ACTUAL CONFUSION REQUiREMENT IS CONTRARY TO THE
LANHAM AcT AND TO GENERAL EQUITABLE PRINCIPLES
This Part will demonstrate that the "actual confusion" rule offends
the principles underlying the Lanham Act and will also present an argu-
ment that the rule is inherently harsh, unfair, and inequitable to trade-
mark owners. Section A will discuss how the Lanham Act and its legis-
lative history manifests Congress's clear intent that the courts grant
monetary relief on a broad, fair, and equitable basis without recourse to
narrow and inflexible rules. Section A will specifically focus on the like-
lihood of confusion test as the Lanham Act's sole test for infringement
and the availability of remedies. Section B will demonstrate that because
of the widely acknowledged, inherent difficulty of proving actual confu-
sion, the actual confusion requirement potentially forecloses any mone-
tary relief in a significant number of infringement or unfair competition
cases. The injured trademark owner is left, therefore, to suffer his losses
regardless of how significant these losses may be. The final Section will
discuss the absurdity of denying damages and/or profits to a trademark
owner who sues in civil court because he cannot prove actual confusion,
while counterfeiters charged under the criminal Anti-Counterfeiting stat-
ute can be sent to jail and face tremendous fines without such a showing
of actual confusion.
A. The Lanham Act's Standard for all Remedies is Likelihood of Confu-
sion
It is axiomatic that the test of liability for trademark infringement
and unfair competition governed under section 43(a) is likelihood of con-
fusion. ' The statutory scheme makes clear that the "injury in fact" on
68. Id. at 182-83.
69. Lanham Act §§ 32(1)(a), 43(a), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114(1)(a), 1125(a) (1994). For example,
section 32(1)(a) provides that:
Any person who shall, without the consent of the registrant- (a) use in commerce any
reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation of a registered mark in connection
with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or advertising of any goods and services on
or in connection with which such use is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or
to deceive... shall be liable in a civil action by the registrant for the remedies hereinafter
provided.
Id. § 32(1)(a), 15 U.S.C. § 11 14(1)(a) (emphasis added). This statutory threshold for liability has
essentially remained constant since the first federal trademark statute. See Trademark Act of 1870,
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which evidence must be adduced in order to determine liability is the
harmful nexus between the protected trademark or trade dress, and the
infringing trademark or trade dress. Whether that nexus exists is a ques-
tion of fact and turns on whether the objectionable designation is likely
to cause confusion or mistake, or to deceive consumers as to the source
of a commercial product or service. ° The only test that the Lanham Act
promulgates in order to impose liability is this logical causal
connection.7' Nothing more is required. If the finder of fact determines
that there is likelihood of confusion, then there is a violation of the Act.72
On its face, the Lanham Act ties most remedies, including the right
to an injunction, damages, profits and costs, to likelihood of confusion. 3
The language of sections 32, 34, 35, 36, and 43(a) expressly entitles a
trademark owner to all of these forms of relief upon a judicial finding of
liability. 4 As mentioned above, evidence of actual confusion is not re-
quired to arrive at a determination of likelihood of confusion." It is
merely one factor among many. ' Therefore, a violation of the Act can
occur whether actual confusion is demonstrated or not. Accordingly, all
remedies provided by the Lanham Act should unconditionally be poten-
tially available even absent evidence of actual confusion." This is the
ch. 230, §§ 78-79, 16 Stat. 210, 211 (1870) (invalidated in 1879, United States v. Steffens, 100 U.S.
82, 82 (1879)); Act of March 3, 1881, ch. 138, §§ 2, 7, 21 Stat. 502 (1881) (repealed 1905);
Trademark Act of 1905, §§ 16, 19, 15 U.S.C. §§ 96, 99 (1905) (repealed 1946); Act of March 19,
1920, § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 124 (1920) (repealed 1946).
70. Lanham Act §§ 32(1)(a), 43(a), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114(1)(a), 1125(a); Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco
Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 782 (1992) (Stevens, J., concurring); Libman Co. v. Vining Indus., Inc.,
69 F.3d 1360, 1365 (7th Cir. 1995).
71. See Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 780 (stating that under the Lanham Act "the ultimate test is
whether the public is likely to be deceived or confused by the similarity of the marks .... Whether
we call the violation infringement, unfair competition or false designation of origin, the test is
identical-is there a 'likelihood of confusion?') (quoting New West Corp. v. NYM Co., 595 F.2d
1194,1201 (1979).
72. Id.; Schwinn Bicycle Co. v. Ross Bicycles, Inc., 870 F.2d 1176, 1184, 1187 (7th Cir.
1989).
73. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114(1), 1116(a), 1117(a), 1118, 1125(a).
74. For example, section 32(l)(a) provides that an infringer who uses a trademark that is likely
to cause confusion "shall be liable in a civil action by the registrant for the remedies hereinafter
provided." Lanham Act § 32(l)(a), 15 U.S.C. § 11 14(l)(a). Similarly, section 35(a) expressly states
that "[w]hen a violation of any right of the registrant of a mark registered in the Patent and
Trademark Office, or a violation of section 1125(a) of this title [(Lanham Act § 43(a))] shall have
been established in any civil action arising under this Act, the plaintiff shall be entitled... to recover
(1) defendant's profits, (2) any damages sustained by the plaintiff, and (3) the costs of the action." 15
U.S.C. § 1117(a).
75. For a discussion of how the existence of actual confusion evidence is useful but not
necessary in a court's consideration of whether likelihood of confusion exists, see supra notes 48-60
and accompanying text.
76. Libman Co. v. Vining Indus., 69 F.3d 1360, 1365 (7th Cir. 1995) (citing Computer Care v.
Service Sys. Enters., 982 F.2d 1063, 1069 (7th Cir. 1992); Schwinn Bicycle Co. v. Ross Bicycles,
Inc., 870 F.2d 1176, 1187 (7th Cir. 1989)).
77. In addition to the plain meaning of the language of the Lanham Act's remedy provisions,
the legislative history strongly suggests that Congress intended courts to mandatorily award the
monetary remedies provided for once they arrived at a finding of likelihood of confusion. See
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inescapable conclusion if one were to limit a review to the explicit lan-
guage of the Lanham Act and the legislative history.
However, courts do not generally have so limited a view. Perhaps
one explanation for the pervasive view that, while the likelihood of con-
fusion standard is reasonable to enjoin future infringement but "some-
thing more is required" to justify a monetary award, is the notion that a
determination of likelihood of confusion is a mere fiction. It is a subjec-
tive finding by a judge or jury that prospective purchasers would proba-
bly be confused or mistaken. The likelihood of confusion standard does
not necessarily measure an absolute fact of future injury. Moreover, the
standard may not always serve as an objective measure of past factual
injury." All courts agree that equity will countenance such a fiction in
concluding whether a trademark owner's goodwill and the nation's con-
sumers would be adequately protected by injunctive relief.'9 Most courts,
however, are simply reluctant to reach into an infringer's cash box on the
basis of so speculative and subjective a finding.' So the courts have
adopted yet another fiction, in the guise of actual confusion, which when
combined with a finding of likelihood of confusion, cumulatively satis-
fies that indefinable "something more.' 8'
That actual confusion evidence provides as tenuous a fiction, if not
more so, as the likelihood of confusion standard is easily realized. Haul-
ing two, ten, or even fifty consumers into court to testify that they pur-
chased an infringing product out of confusion or by mistake simply can-
not lay an objective factual basis that all other consumers who purchased
the product were similarly confused.82 Such testimony can only serve to
prove the factual injury arising out of those particular consumers' pur-
chases. However, most courts rely, and indeed insist, on such testimony
to award damages and/or profits far in excess of the harm incurred by
Hearings on H.R. 4744 Before the Subcomm. on Trademarks of the House Comm. on Patents, 76th
Cong. 154-55 (1939).
78. Courts apply the likelihood of confusion test to measure the probability of prospective
harm. It appears that no reported case ever used the standard alone to explicitly measure the
probability of past harm. The author wonders if there is any real functional distinction in employing
the test to determine whether it is more likely than not that prospective consumers will be confused
by a potentially infringing trademark or trade dress than in using the test to determine whether past
consumers have already been confused.
79. Cf MCCARTHY, supra note 41, § 30.25[4].
80. Cf. id.
81. See id. "The rationale appears to be that at least in cases of competing goods [or services],
proof of some instances of actual confusion strengthens the inference that sales made by the
infringer would have been made by the plaintiff." Id.
82. Despite this, courts are willing to rely on as few as one instance of actual confusion to find
likelihood of confusion and grant monetary relief. See Louisiana World Exposition, Inc. v. Logue,
746 F.2d 1033, 1041 (5th Cir. 1984); Varitronics Sys. Inc. v. Merlin Equip., Inc., 682 F. Supp. 1203,




those purchases."3 Essentially, testimonial evidence from actual confusion
witnesses is a mere substitute for a judge's or jury's own subjective sen-
sibilities to substantiate all other harm caused by the infringing product
beyond that harm arising out of those witnesses' own purchases. The
judicially accepted forms of circumstantial actual confusion evidence
(i.e. surveys and mistaken communications) are even less indicative, in
an objective sense, of the existence of actual injury. Survey evidence, in
particular, bears more on the likelihood of confusion than on any past
instances of actual confusion." For this reason, survey evidence repre-
sents the merging of the fiction of likelihood of confusion into the fic-
tional realm of actual confusion.
Are two fictions necessarily better than one? Maybe, particularly
when there exists a significant amount of evidence of actual consumer
confusion. However, as one prominent commentator has stated, "actual
confusion or damage is notoriously difficult to prove, let alone
quantify.""5 Where actual confusion evidence does not exist, such as in a
tremendous number of the reported cases, the requirement of this type of
evidence can be burdensome and unfair in the extreme, something that
Congress certainly did not contemplate according to the legislative his-
tory of the Lanham Act."
B. Actual Confusion is "Notoriously Difficult to Prove"
The courts and other commentators have universally accepted the
characterization that actual confusion is very difficult to obtain. Even
where a plaintiff possesses some forms of actual confusion evidence, the
plaintiff must overcome significant evidentiary obstacles to get the evi-
dence admitted. In a substantial number of cases, these difficulties effec-
tively foreclose the availability of damages and/or profits.
1. Actual Confusion Evidence is Difficult to Obtain
In literally hundreds of cases, the courts have universally acknowl-
edged that proof of actual confusion is extremely difficult, if not almost
impossible, to secure." The reasons for the difficulty in obtaining actual
83. See cases cited supra note 82.
84. See Pfizer Inc. v. Astra Pharm. Prods., Inc., 858 F. Supp. 1305, 1326 (S.D.N.Y. 1994)
(stating that "[c]onsumer surveys are probably better described as a statistical means of predicting
the likelihood that actual consumers will [be] confuse[d]").
85. McCARTHY, supra note 41, § 30.24[21.
86. For a discussion of Congress's clear intent that courts refrain from adopting stringent,
inflexible rules in granting remedies for trademark infringement or unfair competition, and instead
subject all relief to fairness and equitable principles that are flexibly applied to the circumstances of
the case, see supra notes 21-25 and accompanying text.
87. An exhaustive citation to the cases in which courts have recognized this difficulty would
likely result in one of the most voluminous footnotes in the history of legal scholarship. Having no
interest in achieving this dubious distinction, and wishing to spare the reader as well as himself, the
author merely mentions a fraction of the circuit court cases bearing on this point. See, e.g., Computer
Care v. Service Sys. Enters., 982 F.2d 1063, 1070 (7th Cir. 1992) ("difficult-to-acquire evidence of
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confusion evidence are numerous: (1) the consumer may not realize the
purchasing mistake, believing the infringing product to be the genuine
trademark article;88 (2) the consumer may realize that a mistake has oc-
curred but accepts the infringement as an adequate substitute; (3) the
consumer may not realize to whom a complaint should be sent;89 (4) the
consumer may feel foolish for having made a mistake and be reluctant to
admit to it;' (5) the consumer may complain to a retailer, but the retailer
fails to forward the complaint to the trademark owner or the infringer;9'
(6) the consumer may simply not want to "spend the time to register a
complaint with a faceless corporation;"' or (7) the consumer may not be
actual confusion") (quoting Roulo v. Russ Berrie & Co., 886 F.2d 931, 938 (7th Cir. 1989)); Wynn
Oil Co. v. American Way Serv. Corp., 943 F.2d 595, 602 (6th Cir. 1991) ("evidence of actual
confusion is difficult to produce") (quoting Wynn Oil Co. v. Thomas, 839 F.2d 1183, 1188 (6th Cir.
1988)); Wynn Oil, 839 F.2d at 1188 ("evidence of actual confusion is difficult to produce"); Eclipse
Assocs. Ltd. v. Data Gen. Corp., 894 F.2d 1114, 1118 (9th Cir. 1990) ("difficulty of gathering
[actual confusion] evidence"); Roulo, 886 F.2d at 937 ("difficult-to-acquire evidence of actual
confusion"); Plus Prods. v. Plus Discount Foods, Inc., 722 F.2d 999, 1006 (2d Cir. 1983) ("difficult
to establish actual confusion") (citing W.E. Bassett Co. v. Revlon, Inc., 435 F.2d 656, 662 (2d Cir.
1970)); Golden Door, Inc. v. Odisho, 646 F.2d 347, 351 (9th Cir. 1980) ("actual confusion is
difficult to produce") (citing AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 353 (9th Cir. 1979));
AMF, 599 F.2d at 352-53 ("proving actual confusion is difficult"); Mushroom Makers, Inc. v. R. G.
Barry Corp., 580 F.2d 44, 48 (2d Cir. 1978) ("difficulty of establishing actual confusion"); Scarves
by Vera, Inc. v. Todo Imports Ltd., 544 F.2d 1167, 1175 (2d Cir. 1976) ("'a showing of actual
confusion is... very difficult to demonstrate' with reliable proof') (quoting W.E. Bassett, 435 F.2d
at 662); Grotrian, Helfferich, Shulz, Th. Steinweg Nachf. v. Steinway & Sons, 523 F.2d 1331, 1340
(2d Cir. 1975) ("general difficulty of finding evidence of actual confusion"); W.E. Bassett, 435 F.2d
at 662 ("showing of actual confusion is ... very difficult to demonstrate"); Tisch Hotels, Inc. v.
Americana Inn, Inc., 350 F.2d 609, 612 (7th Cir. 1965) ("reliable evidence of actual confusion is
difficult to obtain") (citing Harold F. Ritchie, Inc. v. Chesebrough-Pond's, Inc., 281 F.2d 755, 761
(2d Cir. 1960)); David Sherman Corp. v. Heublein, Inc., 340 F.2d 377, 381 (8th Cir. 1965) ("it is
usually difficult to ferret out instances of actual confusion even though they exist"); Harold F.
Ritchie, 281 F.2d at 761 (2d Cir. 1960) ("reliable evidence of actual instances of confusion is
practically almost impossible to secure") (quoting Miles Shoes, 199 F.2d at 317); Maternally Yours,
Inc. v. Your Maternity Shop, 234 F.2d 538, 542 (2d Cir. 1956); Miles Shoes, Inc. v. R.H. Macey &
Co., 199 F.2d 602, 603 (2d Cir. 1952); Money Station, Inc. v. Cash Station, Inc., No. 95-1240, 1995
WL 697313, at *4 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 27, 1995) ("difficult to obtain"); Conopco, Inc. v. May Dep't
Stores Co., 46 F.3d 1556, 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1994) ("difficulty of proving actual confusion"); Money
Station, Inc. v. Cash Station, Inc., No. 95-1240, 1995 WL 697313, at *4 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 27, 1995)
("difficult to obtain"); Conopco, Inc. v. May Dep't Stores Co., 46 F.3d 1556, 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1994)
("difficulty of proving actual confusion").
88. See Fisons Horticulture, Inc. v. Vigoro Indus., 30 F.3d 466, 476 n.12 (3d Cir. 1994);
International Kennel Club, Inc. v. Mighty Star, Inc., 846 F.2d 1079, 1090-91 n.6 (7th Cir. 1988).
This lack of consumer recognition of confusion undoubtedly frequently occurs when the infringing
product is a counterfeit.
89. Clark, Inc. v. Resnick, 219 U.S.P.Q. 619, 623 (D.R.I. 1982).
90. See Bottega Veneta, Inc. v. Volume Shoe Corp., 226 U.S.P.Q. 964, 971 (Trademark Trial
& App. Bd. 1985).
91. Id. In many cases, consumer complaints are not received by the trademark owner because
the trademark owner does not have a direct relationship with the ultimate consumer. See Clark, 219
U.S.P.Q. at 623-24. Therefore, the trademark owner must rely on the diligence of retailers to advise
them of consumer complaints, which frequently does not happen. See Cuisinarts, Inc. v. John Boos
& Co., 227 U.S.P.Q. 153, 155 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
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in a position to meaningfully inspect the product to ascertain whether a
mistake has been made.93
Given the nature of the marketplace, each of these reasons provides
a rational, logical and perfectly understandable basis for the difficulty
faced by trademark owners in garnering evidence of actual confusion.
Because of this understandable difficulty, courts universally agree that
evidence of actual confusion is not necessary to a finding of liability.
All courts acknowledge that a lack of provable instances of actual confu-
sion does not mean that consumers have not or will not be confused.
Despite the courts' willingness to take a reasonable stance with re-
spect to the role of actual confusion evidence in determining likelihood
of confusion, the courts nevertheless almost universally require such
evidence in order to claim monetary damages and/or profits, depending
on the circuit. Therefore, by adopting such a requirement for monetary
relief, the courts consciously force injured trademark owners to over-
come evidentiary obstacles that the courts themselves acknowledge are
generally very difficult, if not impossible, to overcome.' This Catch-22
standard is rendered even more untenable by the recognized difficulty of
getting proof of actual confusion that does exist into evidence.
2. Procedural Evidentiary Obstacles
Hampering an injured trademark owner further is the issue con-
cerning the admissibility of actual confusion evidence. A court will give
weight only to properly admissible evidence bearing on actual confusion
by consumers, and there are a number of evidentiary obstacles to over-
come in meeting admissibility standards.
Probably the most difficult obstacle is to entice a consumer who has
manifested actual confusion or mistake to appear and testify in court, sit
for a deposition, or even sign a declaration or affidavit in the first place.
Understandably, many consumers, wary of and unfamiliar with legal
proceedings, may simply refuse to subject themselves to any form of
92. AmBrit, Inc. v. Kraft, Inc., 812 F.2d 1531, 1544 (l1th Cir. 1986). A consumer's
unwillingness to contact the trademark owner may occur frequently when the purchased product is
relatively inexpensive.
93. See generally Getty Petroleum Corp. v. Island Transp. Corp., 878 F.2d 650 (2d Cir. 1989)
(stating that actual confusion has occurred where consumers could not meaningfully recognize that
the gasoline they received was not manufactured by the plaintiff).
94. Courts acknowledge that the "vast majority" of confused consumers never even contact
the trademark owner or the infringer. Kinark Corp. v. Camelot, Inc., 548 F. Supp. 429, 446 (D.N.J.
1982).
95. For a discussion of the courts' recognition that proof of actual confusion is not necessary
to a finding of likelihood of confusion, see supra notes 48-60 and accompanying text.
96. It cannot seriously be considered that Congress, in providing trademark owners monetary
relief as set forth in section 35(a) of the Lanham Act, contemplated such an unfair Catch-22 standard
for the courts' awarding of monetary remedies. Certainly, the legislative history argues otherwise.
For a discussion of Congress's intention that monetary relief should be granted on a fair and
equitable basis, see supra notes 22-24 and accompanying text.
1997]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 75:1
presenting evidence. Fear of testifying, of being cross-examined, or of
simply being legally held accountable for their anecdotal description of a
purchasing experience, coupled with the inconvenience and expense of
travelling potentially long distances, missing work, or leaving their
families, is enough to frighten or otherwise discourage many consumers
from providing trademark owners the necessary and admissible proof of
actual confusion.
Moreover, relying on consumer declarations, affidavits or other
documentary9' evidence of actual confusion can be risky. For example,
while some courts have found these types of evidence to be admissible,
whether or not the declarant is available as a witness," other courts have
disallowed such evidence as exceptions to the hearsay rule." Courts are
even more reluctant to admit oral or documentary evidence that a con-
fused consumer conveyed to a third party"n where the third party himself
presents the evidence.'"' Even if admissible, many courts have given little
weight to out-of-court declarations where the declarant is not identified
and is not available for cross examination.' °
97. For example, consumer letters or written records of telephone inquiries.
98. An oral or written declaration relating to actual confusion in the marketplace may be
generally admissible under the "state of mind" or "present sense impression" exceptions to the rule
against hearsay. FED. R. EviD. 803(1), (3). The rules provide that:
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is
available as a witness: (1) Present sense impression. -A statement describing or
explaining an event or condition made while the declarant was perceiving the event or
condition, or immediately thereafter.... (3) Then existing mental, emotional, or physical
condition. A statement of the declarant's then existing state of mind, emotion, sensation,
or physical condition (such as intent, plan, motive, design, mental feeling, pain, and
bodily health), but not including a statement of memory or belief to prove the fact
remembered or believed unless it relates to the execution, revocation, identification or
terms of declarant's will.
Id.; see also RJ. Toomey Co. v. Toomey, 683 F. Supp. 873, 787 n.7 (D. Mass. 1988); Freddie
Fuddruckers, Inc. v. Ridgeline, Inc., 589 F. Supp. 72, 75 (N.D. Tex. 1984) (admitting oral statements
and letters under Rule 803), aff d, 783 F.2d 1062 (5th Cir. 1986); Mile High Upholstery Fabric Co.
v. General Tire &-Rubber Co., 221 U.S.P.Q. 217, 223 (N.D. 11. 1983) (holding that written records
of telephone inquiries and consumer letters are admissible under Rule 803).
99. See, e.g., Duluth News-Tribune, Inc. v. Mesabi Publ'g Co., 84 F.3d 1093, 1098 (8th Cir.
1996) (holding that misdirected mail and telephone calls constituted hearsay); Vitek Sys., Inc. v.
Abbott Lab., 675 F.2d 190, 194 (8th Cir. 1982) (discounting actual confusion evidence as a "present
sense impression" exception to rule against hearsay); Kusan, Inc. v. Fairway Siding Corp., 7
U.S.P.Q.2d 1202, 1209 (D. Mass. 1988); Pro Hardware, Inc. v. Home Ctrs. of Am., Inc., 607 F.
Supp. 146, 152 (S.D. Tex. 1984).
100. Examples of such third parties would be a retailer who receives a complaint by a confused
consumer, an investigator taking a statement from a confused consumer, or an employee of the
trademark owner who speaks to a consumer about the circumstances of the latter's confusion or
mistake.
101. See Smith Fiberglass Prods., Inc. v. Ameron, Inc., 7 F.3d 1327, 1329 (7th Cir. 1993);
Ocean Bio-Chem, Inc. v. Turner Network Television, Inc., 741 F. Supp. 1546, 1559 & n.7 (S.D. Fla.
1990); Programmed Tax Sys., Inc. v. Raytheon Co., 439 F. Supp. 1128, 1131 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
102. Holiday Inns, Inc. v. Holiday Out in Am., 481 F.2d 445, 448-49 (5th Cir. 1973); CMM
Cable Rep., Inc. v. Ocean Coast Properties, Inc., 888 F. Supp. 192,201 (D. Me. 1995), affd, 97 F.3d
1504 (1st Cir. 1996); Victory Pipe Craftsmen, Inc. v. Faberge, Inc., 582 F. Supp. 551, 558 (N.D. Ill.
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Survey evidence that is offered as circumstantial evidence of actual
confusion can sometimes be very problematic. There are many factors
that bear on whether a particular survey is admissible, and if admissible,
the weight to be placed on it. 3 Among these factors are whether:
(1) the 'universe' was properly defined, (2) a representative sample of
that universe was selected, (3) the questions to be asked of interview-
ees were framed in a clear, precise and non-leading manner, (4) sound
interview procedures were followed by competent interviewers who
had no knowledge of the litigation or the purpose for which the sur-
vey was conducted, (5) the data gathered was accurately reported, (6)
the data was analyzed in accordance with accepted statistical princi-
ples and (7) objectivity of the entire process was assured.
'04
A flaw in any of these factors may render the survey unreliable, if not
inadmissible. 5 Surveys have another important, and sometimes insur-
mountable, disadvantage: surveys are very expensive.
3. Survey Evidence is Very Expensive
Because surveys need to be conducted with a carefully construed
protocol and by experienced and trained interviewers, and because every
step of the interviewing, data collection, reporting and analysis process
needs to be inscrutable, the cost of designing and conducting a survey
can be tremendous. Typically, trademark surveys can cost a litigant be-
tween thirty thousand dollars to one-hundred-fifty thousand dollars."'
1984); Freedom Say. and Loan Ass'n v. Way, 583 F. Supp. 544, 548 (M.D. Fla. 1984), aff'd, 757
F.2d 1176 (1 1th Cir. 1985); National Resources, Inc. v. Nova Resources, Inc., 214 U.S.P.Q. 121, 128
(D. Md. 1981), affd, 701 F.2d 166 (4th Cir. 1983); Mushroom Makers, Inc. v. R. G. Berry Corp.,
441 F. Supp. 1220, 1231 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), aff d, 580 F.2d 44 (2d Cir. 1978).
103. Marshall Field & Co. v. Mrs. Field's Cookies, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d 1321, 1334 (Trademark Trial
& App. Bd. 1992). During the earlier half of this century, courts were reluctant to recognize the
admissibility of trademark surveys. See Coca-Cola Co. v. Chero-Cola Co., 273 F. 755 (D.C. Cir.
1921) (refusing to admit survey evidence bearing on likelihood of confusion); Elgin Nat'l Watch Co.
v. Elgin Clock Co., 26 F.2d 376 (D. Del. 1928) (disallowing survey evidence because the court
determined that such evidence constituted hearsay). In later years, the courts eased the hearsay
restrictions against survey evidence as surveys were conducted using more and more scientific and
reliable methodologies. See generally Edward G. Epstein, Surveys: Growing Admissibility But
Narrow Utilization, 83 TRADEMARK REP. 863 (1993) (discussing the growing reliance of trademark
plaintiffs on survey evidence to establish likelihood of confusion and actual confusion).
104. Toys "R" Us, Inc. v. Canarsie Kiddie Shop, Inc., 559 F. Supp. 1189, 1205 (E.D.N.Y.
1983).
105. For a discussion of some of the recognized pitfalls of relying on survey evidence, see
Epstein, supra note 103, at 863-65. See generally Helene D. Jaffe & Robert G. Sugarman, The Use
of Experts and Survey Evidence in COPYRIGHT, TRADEMARK AND UNFAIR COMPETITION
LITIGATION 477 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, and Literary Property Course Handbook
Series No. 463) (providing a comprehensive discussion of the use of, and problems inherent in,
surveys for trademark litigation).
106. See Trademarks and the Federal Trade Commission: Hearings on H.R. 3685 Before the
Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties and the Admin. of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,
96th Cong. 60 (1979) (testimony of Paul C. Daw, Director, Denver Regional Office, Federal Trade
Commission) (stating that in 1979, consumer surveys could cost "[ulpward of $20,000 apiece, in
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Moreover, because the admissibility and reliability of survey evidence is
still likely to be challenged by the opposing side, litigation costs related
to the defense of a survey can significantly increase."°7
Where actual confusion evidence, such as reported instances of con-
sumer confusion or misdirected communications, is not available, the
actual confusion requirement forces trademark plaintiffs to incur sub-
stantial, and in some cases impossibly excessive, costs to demonstrate
confusion through a consumer survey. Frequently, the damages sustained
by the trademark owner, while real, may not rise to the level that would
justify the substantial expense of conducting an acceptable and admissi-
ble survey. Therefore, the trademark owner must simply suffer his loss.
Moreover, courts have held that where a survey has been conducted, an
award of costs does not include the significant expense of a consumer
survey."
C. Go Directly to Jail
Our system of justice generally requires a higher standard of proof
for the imposition of criminal penalties than for the awarding of civil
monetary awards. It seems absurd, therefore, that an infringer can be
sentenced to a jail term and face significant fines for counterfeiting ac-
tivities without evidence of actual confusion, while a counterfeiter or
infringer need not be found liable for monetary damages or profits in a
civil case where such evidence is lacking. In 1984, Congress enacted the
Trademark Counterfeiting Act of 1984."0s Essentially, this Act imposes
criminal penalties-imprisonment for up to ten years and fines not to
exceed two million dollars for individuals and five million dollars for
corporate counterfeiters-for trafficking in counterfeit merchandise."'
The standard for liability for criminal sanctions is that the defendant
knowingly used on merchandise: (1) a mark that is identical or substan-
tially indistinguishable from the protected trademark, and (2) that the use
of the mark is likely to cause confusion, to cause mistake or to deceive."'
some instances upward of $100,000"). In connection with a relatively simple mall intercept survey to
determine consumer response to an alleged false advertisement, the author was recently quoted a
survey price of $45,000, plus $3,000 a day for expert deposition and trial preparation and attendance.
107. Todd D. Kantorczyk, How to Stop the Fast Break: An Evaluation of the "Three-Peat"
Trademark and the FTC's Role in Trademark Law Enforcement, 2 UCLA ENT. L. REv. 195, 225
(1995).
108. Gillette Co. v. Wilkinson Sword, Inc., No. 89-CV-3586 (KMW), 1992 WL 30938, at *9
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 3, 1992).
109. Trademark Counterfeiting Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 1502, 98 Stat. 2178-2179
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2320 (1994)).
110. 18 U.S.C. § 2320(a).
111. 18 U.S.C. § 2320(d)(1)(A).
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The courts have held that liability under the Trademark Counter-
feiting Act does not require a showing of actual confusion at all. ' As the
Fifth Circuit has held, "[t]he jury need not find actual confusion. The
statute expressly requires only likelihood of confusion.""3 Curiously, the
Lanham Act also merely requires likelihood of confusion for civil liabil-
ity."' Complicating matters further is that the Trademark Counterfeiting
Act expressly provides that all limitations on the remedies provided for
in section 35(a) of the Lanham Act shall be applicable in any prosecution
under the Anti-counterfeiting Act."5 The Fifth Circuit, however, failed to
recognize that the limitation vis-A-vis the requirement for actual confu-
sion evidence for civil remedies was germane in imposing the criminal
sanctions set forth in the Counterfeiting Act."6 Apparently the courts will
send an infringer to jail for up to ten years with no showing of actual
confusion, but will not countenance the imposition of monetary damages
and/or accounting relief in a civil trademark infringement suit without
such evidence. This seems, in a word, bizarre.
CONCLUSION
The legislative history of the Lanham Act, and indeed the language
of the Act itself, demonstrates that Congress intended to provide trade-
mark owners a fair and equitable opportunity to obtain injunctive and
monetary redress for trademark infringement and unfair competition.
Congress purposely stayed clear of setting forth strict, inflexible rules for
recovery of damages and profits, preferring instead to allow the courts to
grant monetary relief based on the circumstances of each case and in
accordance with equitable principles. Despite this, the courts themselves
have erected what Congress expressly avoided: stringent rules for the
recovery of damages and profits. One such rule is that a trademark owner
must offer proof of actual confusion before being entitled to damages,
and in some circuits, profits as well.
Ordinarily, reliable evidence of actual confusion is very difficult,
and sometimes almost impossible, to obtain. The courts universally rec-
ognize this fact. Moreover, where actual confusion evidence does exist,
trademark plaintiffs may face serious evidentiary obstacles in getting
such evidence admitted. Survey evidence which may demonstrate, cir-
cumstantially, actual confusion is sometimes prohibitively expensive for
112. See, e.g., United States v. Yamin, 868 F.2d 130, 133 (5th Cir. 1989) (holding that a jury
need not find evidence of actual confusion in order to impose criminal sanctions for counterfeiting).
113. See Yanin, 868 F.2d at 133 (discounting the need for actual confusion evidence where the
defendants provided proof that consumers were not in fact confused); see also United States v.
Brooks, 11l F.3d 365, 372 (4th Cir. 1997) (holding that in a prosecution under the Trademark
Counterfeiting Act, the "government did not have to prove either actual confusion or an intent to
mislead. Rather, the government was required to prove that the defendant knowingly used a
counterfeit mark that was likely to cause confusion or to mislead").
114. 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a).
115. 18 U.S.C. § 2320(c).
116. Yamin, 868 F.2dat 133; Brooks, I11 F.3dat372.
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some trademark owners. Despite this, the courts nevertheless require
actual confusion evidence of some sort before granting monetary relief.
By adopting an actual confusion rule, the courts have effectively placed
trademark owners in a Catch-22 situation, foreclosing recovery in a large
number of trademark infringement and unfair competition cases. This
result is simply not acceptable in view of the express congressional intent
as demonstrated in the Lanham Act and its legislative history.
